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OPSOMMING
Pashukanis oor Misdaad en Straf
Evgeny Pashukanis is bekend vir die sogenaamde kommoditeits-vorm
regsteorie. Die teorie is gebaseer rondom die verhouding tussen die
regsvorm en die kommoditeitsvorm, wat wentel om die beginsel van
ekwivalensie. Pashukanis het dit as ’n algemene teorie ontwikkel en hy het
dit nog altyd as sulks aanvaar.
Sedert die publikasie daarvan in 1924, was die Pashukanis regsteorie die
teiken van volgehoue kritiek. Een van die mees prominente punte van
kritiek is die bewering dat die teorie nie algemeen toepassbaar is nie en
dat die teorie nie van sy historiese oorsprong in kontraktereg kan ontsnap
nie. Terwyl die beginsel van ekwivalensie toegepas kan word in privaatreg,
weerspieël dit nie die verhoudings in die publiekreg nie. Pashukanis se
poging om misdaad en straf as ’n integrale aspek van die kommoditeits-
vorm teorie aan te bied, is nie oortuigend nie. Die teorie kan slegs slaag as
’n teorie van privaatreg, maar nie as ’n algemene teorie van die reg nie.
Hierdie artikel beoog om die argument dat Pashukanis se teorie nie ’n
algemene teorie is nie, te ondersoek. Dit word gedoen met spesifieke
verwysings na die ontleding van misdaad en straf, en poog om te wys,
histories en analities, dat die beginsel van ekwivalensie ook in hierdie
gebiede van toepassing is. Die ontleding sluit in pleitonderhandeling,
borgtog, noodweer, toestemming en toerekeningsvatbaarheid. In die
algemeen word die onderlinge verhoudings tussen kontrakte, delikte en
misdaad ook ondersoek. Die impak wat die beginsel van ekwivalensie op
straf het word ook verduidelik. Ten slotte is die gevolgtrekking dat daar
geen teenstrydighede tussen strafreg en die beginsel van ekwivalensie is
nie. Inteendeel, strafreg is ’n vertakking van die reg waar hierdie regsvorm
die opvallendste is. Die Pashukanis-regsteorie kan dus beskou word as ’n
algemene regsteorie.
1 Introduction
Evgeny Pashukanis deservedly is famous as the author of the so-called
commodity form theory of law. In his Law and Marxism he postulated
that the form of legal relations held the key to the Marxist critique of law
and that, in turn, the key to comprehending the legal form lay in its
relation to the commodity form. The crucial concept here is the principle
of equivalence or the equality postulate, which Pashukanis classifies
variously as the “first truly juridical idea”1 or the “juridical soul” of
1 Pashukanis Law and Marxism: A General Theory (1978) 168.
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criminal proceedings.2 Just as commodity exchange pivots upon mutual
recognition by commodity owners of one another as equals, so legal
exchange stipulates reciprocal acceptance by legal subjects of one
another as compeers. Indeed, juridification is the alter ego of
commodification, in that the evolution of the legal form tracks the
evolution of the commodity form. In a word, Pashukanis theorised the
legal form as the homologue of the commodity form, with both delimited
in terms of the principle of equivalence.
Pashukanis made it clear always that the historical genesis of his
general theory lay in private law, specifically the law of contract. It is the
branch of law which is both the historical and logical repository of the
notion of equivalence.3 By contrast, criminal justice appears to be far
removed from the commodity form and the idea of equivalence. This
article investigates the relationship between Pashukanism and criminal
justice, attempting to prove that the private law derivation of the
commodity form theory does not preclude its extrapolation to public law
in general and to criminal law in particular. It seeks to convince that the
disjunction between Pashukanism and criminal justice is more apparent
than real. Pashukanis formulated the commodity form theory as a
general theory of law, and the argument herein thus may be read as a
defence of that generality.4
2 Crime and the Principle of Equivalence
The principle of equivalence, as the centrepiece of the Pashukanist
general theory of law grounds the concept of justice in all social
formations structured by the commodity economy. It thus also governs
the comprehension of criminal justice. However, it is not unusual for
commentators to espy a deficiency pertaining to criminal justice in
Pashukanis’s theory. They submit that it is, at bottom, a theory of private
law and, as such, unable to account for criminal law. This position is
exemplified by Warrington:
Pashukanis’s theory is really concerned with private law and the chapter on
criminal law is only added to attempt a spurious theoretical consistency.
Pashukanis merely tries to apply his commodity form theory which had a
certain logical force for private law, to criminal law, where in the formulation
of Pashukanis at least, it clearly has no place.5
2 Pashukanis 177.
3 See Pashukanis 121.
4 See Pashukanis 40. See also Lipson “Is there a Marxist Theory of Law?
Comments on Tushnet” in Marxism: NOMOS XXVI (eds Pennock &
Chapman) (1983) 192: “He maintained … that law as a general form – not
merely piece by piece, but as a general form – was linked in history to that
economic relationship that he said Marx said was at the bottom of all
societies that obtained in the interval between the end of primitive family
subsistence and the beginning of true socialism: namely, the relationship of
commodity exchange”.
5 Warrington “Pashukanis and the Commodity Form Theory” in Legality,
Ideology and the State (ed Sugarman) (1983) 62.
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For Warrington, criminal law “fits uncomfortably into Pashukanis’s
project”.6 Hirst, too, is unconvinced by the Pashukanist approach to
criminal law. He comments:
Crime in capitalism is conceived on the analogy with private law as the
violation by the criminal of a right borne by society, a violation of obligation
which requires recompense. But this extension of the legal form is a mere
ideological cover.7
According to Hirst, the relationship between the commodity form theory
and criminal law is bedevilled by “Pashukanis’s crudities”,8 which
include the “vulgar Marxist-Leninist conception of the state as a coercive
apparatus in the hands of the exploiting class”.9 In other words,
Pashukanis comprehends the criminal law as an instrument of class
domination and his incorporation of it into the legal form is unable to
conceal his alleged instrumentalism. Hirst, it seems, would concur with
Warrington that Pashukanis’s approach to criminal law involves
theoretical artifice to generalise his theory beyond its origins in private
law.
The scepticism regarding the compass of the commodity form theory
of law amounts to a serious assault upon the coherence of Pashukanism.
It is necessary, therefore, to examine what Pashukanis has to say on the
matter. For him, crime is a special form of contract, a retrospectively
imposed contract.
“Felony can be seen as a particular variant of circulation, in which the
exchange relation, that is the contractual relation, is determined
retrospectively, after arbitrary action by one of the parties.”10
The party who has taken the arbitrary action is the offender. He wishes
a one-sided relation, from which he is the sole beneficiary,11 with the
victim as utter loser.12 The criminal law intervenes to abolish the
privilege of asymmetry claimed by the offender. The state impresses him
into a contract after he already has had his satisfaction, and he is forced
to render performance to his victim. By his crime, the offender has
6 Warrington 62.
7 Hirst On Law and Ideology (1979) 115.
8 Hirst “Introduction” in Ownership of the Image: Elements for a Marxist Theory
of Law (Edelman) (1979) 10.
9 Hirst On Law and Ideology (1979) 114.
10 Pashukanis 168. Melossi & Pavarini The Prison and the Factory: Origins of the
Penitentiary System (1981) 2 refer to this formulation as “the famous thesis
of Pashukanis”.
11 See Ripstein Equality, Responsibility and the Law (1999) 10: “Crime consists
in the pursuit of private rationality in the face of the rights of others, of the
wrongdoer’s substitution of his private rationality for public terms of
reasonableness”.
12 See Ripstein 144: “The criminal, by intentionally or recklessly violating the
victim’s rights, expresses a denial of the victim’s value. In substituting
private rationality for public standards of reasonableness, the criminal
declares the victim’s rights irrelevant”.
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violated the principle of equivalence which defines all things juridical.
The criminal law exists to reinstate this juridical prime directive.
The notion of founding the comprehension of crime upon the principle
of equivalence has an ancient provenance. As Pashukanis observes, it
was Aristotle who was the progenitor of the “definition of crime as an
involuntarily concluded contract”.13 This definition constitutes one
aspect of the Aristotelian category of remedial or corrective justice which
is “manifested in the adjustment of balance in transactions between man
and man” (as opposed to distributive justice which is concerned with the
“distributions of honour, wealth or whatever else is divisible among those
who enjoy citizen rights”).14 Aristotle divided remedial justice into
voluntary and involuntary transactions, the former referring to
“transactions based on a contract between the parties, which one or the
other has broken”, and the latter to “transactions independent of any
consent, in which one party has wronged the other”.15
Aristotle’s domain of involuntary transactions includes crimes as non-
consensual contracts.16 The offender has trashed the normal relationship
of equality with his victim, and claimed a position of superiority for
himself. The aim of remedial justice is “to restore a violated and
interrupted equality”.17 Aristotle understands justice as “a sort of
equality” as opposed to injustice which is a “sort of inequality”.18 He
argues thus:
It makes no difference whether a good man has defrauded a bad man or vice
versa, nor whether adultery has been committed by a good or a bad man. If
one person is in the wrong and another is suffering wrong, ie if one has
inflicted and the other sustained an injury, the law looks only to the specific
nature of that injury. This kind of injustice, therefore, is an inequality, and the
judge tries to equalise it. Even where one person has been wounded, or has
suffered death, at another’s hands the ‘being done to’ and the ‘doing’ are
represented by a line divided into unequal segments; but the judge tries by
means of the penalty he imposes to equalise the wrong suffered and the
wrong done, subtracting from the ‘gain’.19
In Pashukanist terms, Aristotelian equalisation is achieved by the
retrospective construction of the crime as a contract in order to
13 Pashukanis 169.
14 Aristotle (trans J Warrington) Ethics (1963) 1130b18-1131a6. See also Ross
Aristotle (1949) 210.
15 Barker The Politics of Aristotle (1952) 363. Aristotle 1130b18ff identifies two
classes of involuntary transactions, namely, clandestine and violent. The
former include theft, adultery, poisoning, procuring, enticement of slaves,
assassination and false witness; the latter span assault, imprisonment,
murder, robbery with violence, mutilation, abuse and insult.
16 See Ross 211; Barker The Political Thought of Plato and Aristotle (1959) 343.
17 Barker (1959) 343.
18 Aristotle 1131b36-37.
19 Aristotle 1132a2-25.
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rehabilitate the equality postulate between the offender and victim as
involuntary contractants.20
2 1 Plea Bargaining
The contemporary exemplar of the Aristotelian contractarian approach
to crime is the so-called plea bargain. The standard plea bargain involves
the accused pleading guilty in exchange for a sentence lighter than that
likely to follow a trial conviction.21 Despite its criminal justice setting, the
plea bargain is a contractual transaction, which complies with all the
essential requirements of classical contract law.22 Indeed, the very
notion of a bargain entrains a bundle of contractual relations. Scott and
Stuntz explain: “Plea bargains are, as the name suggests, bargains: it
seems natural to argue that they should be regulated and evaluated
accordingly.”23
They submit further that in the United States, plea bargaining is so
routine and ubiquitous that it “is not some adjunct to the criminal justice
system; it is the criminal justice system”.24 It seems that contract is
constitutive of criminal justice as a system, at least in the land of the plea
bargain.25
2 2 Bail
Unlike the USA, most other criminal jurisdictions continue to rely upon
the criminal trial as the barometer of liability. However, even in trial-
based systems, contractual relations feature prominently in the crucial
issue of bail.26 Van der Berg is explicit:
20 See Ripstein 134: “The criminal law serves primarily to protect and
vindicate fair terms of interaction”.
21 Thus, the standard plea bargain is really a plea and sentence bargain.
Variations include pleading guilty to lesser or fewer charges in exchange for
sentence reduction or bargaining only about the plea and leaving the
sentence to the discretion of the court. The commodified character of the
plea bargain is apparent to Sandefur “In Defence of Plea Bargaining” 2003
Regulation 31: “The courtroom may not seem like a place for haggling, but
that is exactly what it is, in both civil and criminal contexts. A civil
defendant can settle his case for a certain sum; a criminal defendant for a
certain amount of time”.
22 For a thorough discussion and defence of the contractual core of plea
bargaining, see generally Scott & Stuntz “Plea Bargaining as Contract” 1992
Yale LJ 1910 who, inter alia, advise that the courts have developed “a body of
contract-based law to regulate the plea bargaining process”. See also
Sandefur 28.
23 Scott & Stuntz 1910, original emphasis. See also Sandefur 28.
24 Scott & Stuntz 1912, original emphasis.
25 See generally Fisher Plea Bargaining’s Triumph: A History of Plea Bargaining
in America (2003).
26 Caldwell Criminology (1965) 350 defines bail pithily as “security furnished to
the court for the appearance of the defendant whenever his presence is
needed.” See also De Haas “Concepts of the Nature of Bail in English and
American Criminal Law” 1946 U Toronto LJ 387.
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The granting of bail is in the nature of a contract in terms of which the state
commits itself to the accused’s continued interim freedom once the court has
authorised his release, while the accused commits himself to standing trial. It
is apparent that the contracting parties are the state and the accused,
although the discretion to grant bail vests in the court 27
He considers that bail should be governed entirely by freedom of
contract and argues that “the court’s involvement in the bail contract is
anomalous and even undesirable, more so where the state and the
accused have agreed upon acceptable terms of the bail contract”.28 He
would have the court ejected from the process as far as possible and
leave the settlement of the quantum and conditions of bail to the
contractants. He wishes freedom of contract to be properly constitutive
of this pivotal pre-trial dimension: contractants are to be left to their own
devices; only if they are unable to reach consensus would the court have
to intercede to resolve the impasse. He even proposes that the Criminal
Code be amended to this effect.29
2 3 Private Defence
Contractual relations and the equality postulate feature also in two
popular substantive criminal law defences, namely, private defence and
consent. Both are justifications, in the sense that conduct which complies
with their criteria is considered not to be unlawful.
One of the requirements of private defence is that the response of the
accused to an unlawful attack, upon himself or a third party, be
reasonable. This requirement translates into a measure of proportionality
or equivalence between the harms on either side of the criminal
confrontation. In other words, the violence deployed by the defender
should be commensurate, more or less, with that perpetrated or
threatened by the attacker. An excessively violent defence is, per
definitionem, unreasonable and will transform the defender himself into
an unlawful attacker.30
In Pashukanist terms, the defender who responds reasonably to an
unlawful attack has adhered to the principle of equivalence; and,
provided the other requirements of the defence have been satisfied, he
will not be liable for the harm suffered by the attacker. The
reasonableness of the defence operates to refute the assertion of
advantage, of “private rationality”, entailed in the original attack and to
reconstitute the principle of equivalence. Despite its public law-ness,
there is a relatively comfortable fit between private defence and
Pashukanis’s notion of crime: the contractual leitmotif of equivalence is
embedded in the composition of the defence.
27 Van der Berg Bail: A Practitioner’s Guide (2012) 9.
28 Van der Berg 10.
29 Van der Berg 11.
30 See Burchell Principles of Criminal Law (2005) 239-242; Snyman Criminal
Law (2008) 109-112.
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2 4 Consent
Consent is perhaps the prime example of a contractual justification in the
criminal law. It is a defence which proceeds from the autonomy of the
legal subject, accepting that each has the freedom to transact with his
interests as he sees fit, including assenting to their being violated by
another. Subject autonomy is extensive and comprehensive, provided its
exercise does not conflict with the boni mores.31 The freedom to consent
to harm evidently is analogous to freedom of contract. Both are derived
from the philosophy of individualism which pervades the commodity
economy and both are grounded in the autonomy of the legal subject as
the juridical materialisation of the commodity owner.
It is well established that consent to being harmed must be real, that
is, it must not be given under duress or extracted by way of a fraud
pertaining to a material aspect of the transaction in question. Also, the
consent in question must be lawful, and the person consenting must
have the capacity to do so.32 These stipulations are integral also to the
consensus which is required for all valid contracts.33 In other words,
there is a discernible contractual dimension to the criminal law defence
of consent. At first blush, the equality postulate may appear inapplicable
to situations where one person allows another to infringe his rights or
interests. However, consent probably is raised most often in cases of sex
crimes and medical treatment. In such cases it is not difficult to relate the
postulate to notions of sexual gratification or to therapeutic or non-
therapeutic satisfaction.
2 5 Criminal Capacity
In South African law, the accused must possess the intellectual apparatus
needed to commit a crime. That is, he has to be able to comprehend the
distinction between right and wrong, and to modulate his conduct
according to this distinction. An accused who, for whatever reason, lacks
either of these abilities at the time of the offence, will escape liability for
lack of criminal capacity.34 This absence founds such defences as youth,
insanity, provocation, intoxication and non-pathological criminal
incapacity.
Contractual capacity or “the competence to create rights and duties by
concluding a contract with another person or persons”,35 is the
counterpart of criminal capacity. As with crime, contractants must be
31 It usually stops short only at death: in most jurisdictions the legal subject is
not free to consent to being murdered. See Snyman 125; Burchell 326.
32 See Snyman 127; Burchell 340-346.
33 See Van der Merwe et al Contract: General Principles (1993) 13-14, 73-74, 85-
86, 91-92, 139-141.
34 See Snyman 160; Burchell 358.
35 Kuschke “Criminal Capacity” in The Law of Contract in South Africa (eds
Hutchison & Pretorius) (2012) 150.
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endowed with the intellectual wherewithal to enter into contractual
relations, and 
the extent to which a person has capacity to contract depends upon his ability
to form and express a legally relevant will, which in turn depends upon the
ability to appreciate the nature and effect of his or her act.36 
Contracts purported to be concluded by persons who do not possess the
requisite capacity generally are invalid. Thus, for example, infantes do
not possess the capacity to contract, and contracts concluded by the
insane and heavily intoxicated persons may be voided for lack of
contractual capacity or voidable for deficient contractual capacity. Given
the historical priority of contract over crime, the roots of criminal
capacity lie deep in the soil of contractual capacity.
2 6 Contract, Delict and Crime
Examples, however many or compelling, by themselves cannot
comprise a finished argument for the Pashukanist position on crime. Still,
the examples considered above, in combination, are highly evocative of
the contractual core of criminal law, and give a sense that Pashukanis’s
“famous thesis” perhaps is not as exotic as critics have insinuated. They
suggest that his contractual theory of crime well may be a licit derivation
from the commodity form theory of law. The sequel will attempt to
theorise this proposition by examining briefly the interrelations of
contract, crime and delict.
The law of delict probably stands abreast with the law of contract as
being quintessentially private and governed by the principle of
equivalence.37 The “contractual” nature of delict is apparent in the
plaintiff’s claim for recompense for the harm suffered at the hands of the
defendant. Indeed, it is acknowledged generally that a complete overlap
between contract and delict is possible, in that a breach of contract may
amount also to a delict.38 However, unlike breach of contract, an action
in delict does not take place in the context of a pre-existing voluntary
agreement. Hutchison explains:
The essential difference between contractual and delictual obligations
is that the former are, as a general rule, voluntarily assumed by the
parties themselves, whereas the latter are imposed by law, irrespective
of the will of the parties.39
36 Kuschke 150.
37 See Ripstein 246.
38 See Boberg The Law of Delict: Volume 1 Aquilian Liability (1984) 1; Burchell
Principles of Delict (1993) 3-4; Hutchison “The Nature and Basis of Contract”
in The Law of Contract in South Africa (eds Hutchison & Pretorius ) (2012) 8-
9.
39 Hutchison 8. See also Lubbe & Murray Farlam & Hathaway: Contract (1988)
1: “Contractual obligations are created by agreement (or apparent
agreement) of parties. Unlike many other obligations, they are supposed to
arise voluntarily. An obligation based on delict, on the other hand, arises ex
lege when a legal subject wrongfully and without adequate justification,
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Thus, in the law of delict the equality postulate is animated
imperatively, when the plaintiff demands satisfaction by way of
litigation. Not unlike the criminal law, then, the law of delict also operates
in coercive conditions, with the defendant being drafted against his will
into a determinate legal relation with the plaintiff, to answer for the
damage which his errantry has occasioned. His conduct has violated the
principle of equivalence and introduced disproportion into his
relationship with the plaintiff. The law operates to countermand the
inequality between the parties caused by the delict. Contractants have an
ex ante commitment to the principle of equivalence; with a delict, the
principle of equivalence is deployed ex post facto at the instance of the
plaintiff.40
The overlap between the law of delict and criminal law around the
principle of equivalence may be extrapolated directly from the routine
coincidence of circumstance between delict and crime. According to Van
den Heever:
A delict is not a distinct factual concept; it is merely a wrong regarded from
the individual’s point of view and in the light of procedure. When the state
assumes the right to pursue a wrong, to exact punishment and so effect
atonement we call the proceedings criminal and the wrong, regarded from
this point of view, a crime. The state may also allow the individual directly
harmed by the wrong to sue for a readjustment of his interests infringed by
it.41
Thus, delict and crime occupy more or less the same factual space insofar
as “all of the crimes against person and property are also delicts”.42 The
distinctions between them are socio-legal and pertain primarily to their
definitional limits and juridical classification. As a result of the different
jurisprudential lenses through which they are viewed, crime is
understood to have an eminently public law face whereas delict is
demarcated in private law terms. However, the disparate perspectives
cannot obfuscate completely their common contractual countenances.
As seen above, the contractualisation of delict to enforce the principle of
equivalence is uncontroversial. There appears to be no opposition of
substance to the idea that the plaintiff’s demand for recompense
according to the contractual principle of equivalence is dependent upon
the ex lege and ex post facto imposition of delictual obligations upon the
defendant. Since delict and crime are juridical obverses, it seems logical
to extend the contractual view of delict to crime. In this context, the
Pashukanist formulation of crime as an involuntary contract concluded
ex post facto acquires a meaning which is both sensible and defensible.
In an economy of generalised commodity production, the principle of
39 intentionally or negligently, infringes a recognised interest of another to the
detriment of that person.”
40 See Loubser “Concurrence of Contract and Delict” 1997 Stell LR 113-114.
41 Van den Heever Aquilian Damages in South African Law: Volume 1 (1944) 2.
See also Turner Kenny’s Outlines of Criminal Law (1962) 1.
42 Burchell Principles of Delict (1993) 2. See also Snyman 4; Boberg 1-3.
  Pashukanis on crime and punishment    495
equivalence is the necessary fundament of the legal form and juridical
relations needs to be premised upon subject equality. Both crime and
delict obey this juridical requisite, albeit from opposite ends of the public
law-private law divide.
The intersections of contract, delict and crime reflect the fact that their
differences are more ostensible than intrinsic, given that one course of
misconduct may qualify as either a breach of contract or as a delict, and
that behaviour which is prima facie criminal simultaneously may be
delictual. Contract, delict and crime evidently comprise an integrated
circuit of liability structured by a collective obeisance to the principle of
equivalence. Burchell observes that crime and delict differ formally but
not materially.43 This insight may be extended readily to the opposition
between contract and delict, to produce a triad of commingled concepts
each substantively indistinguishable from the others. From a Pashukanist
perspective, however, it is the contract component of the triad which is
pivotal. Contract may be comprehended as the grundnorm from which is
derived the criminal and delictual components. In other words, crime
and delict are variants of the equality postulate which is the constitutional
core of contract.
Hence, the homology between the commodity form and the legal form
is valid also for criminal law. Indeed, Pashukanis considers that “the
characterisation ‘criminal law’ becomes utterly meaningless if this
principle of the equivalent relation disappears from it”.44
Such is the intended reach of the general theory: The notion of
equivalence which is a structural feature of every contract is
comprehended also to be a compositional trait of every crime.45 His
critics notwithstanding, Pashukanis’s approach to the criminal law is
neither crude nor contrived.
3 Punishment and the Principle of Equivalence
Pashukanis embraces the equality postulate as a theoretical imperative.
Unsurprisingly, therefore, he invokes it also in his analysis of
punishment. For him, punishment is about equivalent requital. It is an
exchange transaction which places the offender on an equal footing with
his victim. The offender has asserted a claim to unrequited priority over
his victim; punishment puts him in his place, literally, by coercing his
43 Burchell Principles of Delict (1993) 57.
44 Pashukanis 176.
45 See Arthur “Editor’s Introduction” in Pashukanis Law and Marxism: A
General Theory (1978) 15; Jakubowski Ideology and Superstructure in
Historical Materialism (1990) 49. See also Stone “The Place of Law in the
Marxian Structure-Superstructure Archetype” 1985 Law and Soc R 44-45.
Interestingly, Stone, who is no friend of Pashukanis, considers that
Pashukanis’s “views on criminal law are insightful” and submits that they
“may be analogised to many other areas of law”, identifying “tortious
conduct” as one such area.
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acquiescence in the principle of equivalence.46 Punishment, like crime,
is governed by the law of the commodity. The criminal sanction is the
performance due by the offender under the contract which perforce he
has concluded with his victim. If crime is the violation of the equality
postulate then punishment is its vindication.
Pashukanis’s theory of punishment has elicited objections similar to
those heaped upon his theory of crime. For example, Hunt alleges
vociferously that Pashukanis’s theorisation of a correspondence between
the commodity form and punishment is tantamount to lexical sleight of
hand:
The weakness of his treatment lies precisely in the fact that the identity he
seeks to establish lies in nothing more than the verbal equation achieved by
the dual usage of equivalence and the assertion that the verbal
correspondence evidences a real correspondence.47
For Hunt, it seems, Pashukanis is a latter-day Schoolman stretching the
subtleties of logic beyond their legitimate limits. Warrington, too, will
have no truck with the theory of equivalent punishment and dismisses it
summarily and contumeliously as “faintly comic”.48 The remainder of
this section attempts to defend Pashukanis against such criticism.
As with his theory of crime, Pashukanis’s theory of punishment is
grounded in very reputable historical precedent, this time in the
jurisprudence of Hugo Grotius. The Dutch master was unequivocal about
punishment as equivalent requital: “It is undoubtedly one of the first
principles of justice to establish an equality between the penalty and the
offence”.49
His explanation of this first principle of justice expressly attributes an
unmistakable contractual texture to the nature of punishment:
Now in the eye of the law, every penalty is considered as a debt out of a
crime, and which the offender is bound to pay to the aggrieved party. And in
this there is something approaching to the nature of contracts. For as a seller,
though no express stipulation be made, is understood to have bound himself
by all the usual, and necessary conditions of a sale, so, punishment being a
natural consequence of crime, every heinous offender appears to have
voluntarily incurred the penalties of law.50
Grotius highlights punishment as a voluntary aspect of the contract
between offender and victim. This voluntariness may be understood as
supplementary to the involuntariness of the contract as a whole. In other
words, if crime entails the retrospective imposition of a contract upon the
offender, then that contract entails a prior conscious acceptance by the
46 See Ripstein 160-161.
47 Hunt Explorations in Law and Society: Toward a Constitutive Theory of Law
(1993) 81.
48 Warrington 62.
49 Grotius (trans A Campbell) The Rights of War and Peace (1979) 2 20 2.
50 Grotius 2 20 2, original emphasis.
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offender of the punishment prescribed by law for his crime. In this
connection, every decision to break the law may be taken as “a voluntary
contract to submit to punishment”.51 Grotius considered this conception
of punishment to be Aristotelian in origin:
For, as Michael the Ephesian observes on the fifth book of Aristotle’s
Nicomachean Ethics, the ancients gave the name contract, not only to the
voluntary agreements which men made with each other, but to the
obligations arising from the sentence of the law.52
All in all, then, it seems that Pashukanis took his cue from jurisprudential
sources which confer upon the contractual theory of punishment the
same historical legitimacy accorded the contractual theory of crime. In
the Pashukanist analytic, crime and punishment constitute a juridical
dialectic which is mediated by the principle of equivalence embedded in
their common contractual constitution.
Historically, the evolution of the principle of equivalence echoed the
evolution of the commodity economy. However, commodity production
emerged comparatively late in the pantheon of social development.
Humankind’s aboriginal mode of production was primitive communism,
a form of social organisation born of the precariousness of existence in
inhospitable natural conditions. The fundamental prehistoric social unit
was the primitive commune which was premised upon the practice of
equality in all things.53 Prehistoric justice was blood revenge: given the
ethos of egalitarianism, an injury to any member of the primitive
commune, because it put the existence of the commune at risk, was
experienced as an injury to the commune as a whole.54 Blood revenge
was a mechanism of self-preservation55 and meant that any and all
members of the victim commune could exact revenge against any and
all members of the offender commune.56 Thus, blood revenge was
indiscriminate, and would lead routinely to the blood feud, that is, an
open and inconclusive vendetta between communes.
However, over time the primitive communards came to appreciate the
real dangers of mutual destruction embedded in the blood feud, and
transformed it into the lex talionis. The law of retaliation determined that
revenge had to be moderated by the principle of equivalent requital. In
other words, the blood feud had to be controlled to the extent that there
had to be a literal correspondence between harm suffered and revenge
taken: an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth and so forth.57 The
prehistoric lex talionis meant, essentially, the customary regulation of
blood revenge according to the primitive communist commitment to
51 Grotius 2 20 2.
52 Ibid.
53 See Reed Woman's Evolution: From Matriarchal Clan to Patriarchal Family
(1975) 197-198; Manfred A Short History of the World: Volume 1 (1974) 12.
54 See Briffault The Mothers (1959) 267.
55 See Lafargue The Evolution of Property (1975) 161.
56 See Lafargue 166.
57 Pashukanis 168.
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complete equality. During this epoch, commodity production was non-
existent for the most part and episodic only during the transition from
prehistory to history. Hence, the original lex talionis did not bear the
imprint of the commodity form and its equality postulate.
Civilisation commenced with the break-up of the primitive commune
and the installation of the commodity form as the economic centrepiece
of the new society.58 The penal correlate of this historic socio-economic
transformation was the shift from blood revenge to composition.59 The
latter was “a system of expiatory payment”60 which allowed offenders to
pay for their infractions, literally, provided they could afford to do so.61
It transformed the talionic notion of an eye for an eye into the pecuniary
notion of an eye for value.62 As Ripstein puts it:
Historically, criminal law begins to supplant revenge when the ideas of
compensation and finality are introduced. The idea of compensation is
always a commodity-bound idea, because it is the idea of the equivalent.63
Composition was the lex talionis commodified. With its advent,
equivalence took on an economic character. Literal equivalence gave
way to economic equivalence, and biological formulae were replaced by
calculation of abstract values.64 The juridical moment had arrived.
For an institution to be juridical it must adhere to the principle of
equivalence.65 Punishment, in its evolutionary aspect, is such an
institution. Its genesis coincides with the genesis of the commodity form
and its progression mirrors the advance of commodity production and
circulation. It is constituted in terms of equivalent requital: the offender
has to pay for the harm he has caused, and the payment must be
commensurate with the degree of harm suffered by the victim.66 In this
context, the criminal sanction becomes “a form of exchange, a peculiar
form of circulation, which has its place alongside ‘normal’ commercial
circulation”.67 For Pashukanis, then, punishment is a type of commodity
exchange.
58 See Mandel Introduction to Marxism (1979) 19; Novack Understanding
History: Marxist Essays (1980) 44-45.
59 See Newman Law and Economic Organisation (1983) 163.
60 Pashukanis 168.
61 The indigent were excluded from the system of composition ab initio and
had to endure the pain and indignities of physical punishment for their
transgressions.
62 See Lafargue 174.
63 Ripstein 251.
64 Pashukanis 170. See also Melossi & Pavarini 2-3: “The transition from
private vendetta to retributive punishment, that is, the transition from an
almost ‘biological’ phenomenon to a juridical category, requires as a
necessary precondition the cultural dominance of the concept of equivalents
based on exchange value.”
65 Pashukanis 170 theorises an identity between “the juridical idea” and “the
idea of the equivalent”.
66 See Pashukanis 169.
67 Pashukanis 176.
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As an attribute of the commodity economy, punishment is governed
by the measure of value of every commodity: labour and time. The form
of punishment in which the development of criminal justice under
capitalism has summated is imprisonment, that is, the exchange of a
determinate portion of the offender’s freedom, measured in time, for the
harm his crime has caused. As Pashukanis demonstrates, the jail term is
an obvious derivative of the exchange transaction which underlies the
legal form. Despite the emergence of many other forms of criminal
sanction, incarceration has remained dominant in all capitalist social
formations. It has turned out to be the hardy perennial.68
Imprisonment articulates the principle of equivalence most
completely, more so even than the pecuniary sanction. Not every
offender can afford to pay a fine. But every offender can be incarcerated.
The prison (despite whatever sordid conditions the offender may have to
endure) is the ironic flagship of equality in the criminal justice system.
Imprisonment is the penal materialisation of the principle of equivalence.
It is the paradigmatic means whereby the state is able to recover the
juridical relation which the crime has infracted, and to secure the
preservation of the legal form.
Imprisonment, in any form, including periodical imprisonment and
imprisonment with hard labour,69 is essentially an exchange transaction,
in which the currency is freedom, measured in determinate time periods.
For Pashukanis:
Deprivation of freedom, for a period stipulated in the court sentence, is the
specific form in which modern, that is to say bourgeois-capitalist, criminal
law embodies the principle of equivalent recompense.70
He continues:
The offender answers for his offence with his freedom, in fact with a portion
of his freedom corresponding to the gravity of his action. This conception of
liability would be quite superfluous in a situation where punishment has lost
the character of an equivalent. Were there really no trace of the principle of
equivalence remaining, then punishment would entirely cease to be
punishment in the juridical sense of the word.71
It is a logical requisite of the commodity economy that its penal regime
be centred upon the prison sentence. It is the great leveller, not only as
68 See Melossi & Pavarini 185, original emphasis: “Punishment in prison – as
the deprivation of a quantum of liberty – becomes punishment par
excellence in a society producing commodities; the idea of retribution by
equivalent thus finds in prison punishment its most complete realisation
precisely in so far as (temporary) loss of liberty represents the most simple
and absolute form of ‘exchange value’”.
69 Hudson “Punishment and Control” in The Oxford Handbook of Criminology
(eds Maguire et al) (2002) 251 notes “the return of hard labour” in
contemporary imprisonment regimes.
70 Pashukanis 180-181.
71 Pashukanis 179.
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regards the inequality between offender and victim, but also as regards
offenders inter se.
Incarceration creates the abstract offender, the generic criminal, who
concentrates in his person all manner and method of criminal behaviour.
It is thus a device of equalisation. It ensures that the offender gives
satisfaction to the victim, and that he does so on terms which are equal
relative to every other offender. The expanded reproduction of the
commodity economy depends crucially upon the ordered reproduction
of the legal form. The prison sentence is the one form of punishment
which has proved itself indispensable thus far to the reproduction of the
legal form in the sphere of criminal justice.
Punishment, then, is necessarily about equivalent requital. It is a
conception which is derived historically from the dissolution of the
natural economy and the concomitant evolution of generalised
commodity production as an economy of labour time. Pashukanis
explains:
For it to be possible for the idea to emerge that one could make recompense
for an offence with a piece of abstract freedom determined in advance, it was
necessary for all concrete forms of social wealth to be reduced to the most
abstract and simple form, to human labour measured in time.72
The archetypal capitalist form of criminal punishment thus is linked
intimately to the archetypal capitalist form of production and exchange.
The spirit of the commodity is so ubiquitous that it penetrates even the
steel gates and concrete walls of the prison.
As the penal manifestation of commodity exchange, the notion of
equivalent requital applies also to all other forms of punishment,
including such non-custodial sanctions as the fine, correctional
supervision, property forfeiture and community service. They, too, are
structured according to the desideratum of parity which makes of state
punishment the juridical phenomenon that it is. Pashukanis observes:
In principle, punishment in keeping with guilt represents the same form as
retaliation in proportion to the injury. Its most characteristic feature is the
arithmetical expression of the severity of the sentence: so and so many days,
weeks, and so forth, deprivation of freedom, so and so high a fine, loss of
these or those rights.73
The form of the criminal sanction is thus of little consequence. The
essence of each form, whether custodial or non-custodial, is given by the
principle of equivalent requital. As Pashukanis notes, this principle is an
72 Pashukanis 181. See also Melossi & Pavarini 184-185: “The idea of the
deprivation of an abstractly determined quantity of liberty, as the dominant
form of penal sanction can in fact only be realised with the advent of the
capitalist system of production, that is, in that economic process which
reduces all forms of social wealth to that most simple and abstract form of
human labour measured in time”.
73 Pashukanis 180.
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“essentially absurd idea”. From the non-juridical point of view it is
nonsensical to attempt to equate every harm occasioned by every crime
with deprivation of freedom measured in time. But this is an absurdity
which cannot be avoided for “so long as the commodity form and the
resultant legal form continue to make their mark on society”.74 A rational
basis for punishment is possible only if and when it may be reconstructed
outside of the juridical paradigm. And it likely will take a social revolution
to transcend this paradigm and deprive it of its current authoritative
status.
In sum, Pashukanis’s theory of punishment accords completely with
the commodity form theory of law. Certainly, there is nothing either
comical or concocted about comprehending the criminal sanction as a
variant of commodity exchange. Warrington deployed mockery as a
weapon of criticism without making any attempt whatsoever to ground
it analytically.75 Hunt sought to trivialise Pashukanis’s theoretical
sophistication by portraying it as a scholastic rhetorical device. Such
facile attempts at critique matter little for a theory of punishment which
is anchored in the materiality of the commodity form.
4 Crime, Class and Coercion
The state is a party to every criminal justice transaction. The offence is
construed as a contravention of a state norm and the state generally
directs the prosecutorial process. Criminal justice is, in a word, an affair
of state. But the contemporary state is the capitalist state, and criminal
justice is thus also capitalist justice. This is the context of Pashukanis’s
contention that, in the capitalist epoch, state hegemony over the criminal
justice system is one of the weapons at the disposal of the bourgeoisie to
protect its class rule and to fend off the demands of the dominated
classes.76 Indeed, Pashukanis tells us that “criminal justice in the
bourgeois state is organised class terror”.77 Such is the class content of
the criminal law. It is that branch of the law which expresses most
directly the violence immanent in the rule of the bourgeoisie, including
its most advanced legal form of the Rechtsstaat.78
74 Pashukanis 185.
75 Norrie “Pashukanis and the Commodity Form Theory: A Reply to
Warrington” 1982 International Journal of the Sociology of Law 432 makes
the following astute observation about Warrington’s effort to ridicule
Pashukanis’s theory of punishment: “This amusing quality of the theory is
apparently self-evident since we are not told why it is faintly comic.”
76 Pashukanis 173. It must be noted that the class nature of the state is not
Pashukanis’s primary concern. He deals with it only after he has established
the role of the state in the reproduction of the commodity and legal forms.
These two aspects of “bourgeois statedom” operate at distinct levels of
abstraction, the latter at a higher level than the former. It is the latter aspect
which is integral to the general theory of law.
77 Pashukanis 173.
78 See Jessop The Capitalist State: Marxist Theories and Methods (1982) 84-85.
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Hunt considers that Pashukanis’s highlighting the class content of the
criminal law imports a dualism into his analysis of law:
Thus he introduces a sharp polarity between two modes of law, the criminal
law as a means of securing class domination and the civil law as the
mechanism governing the exchange relations between atomised legal
subjects.79
Hirst, too, is concerned about the disintegrative impact of class conflict
upon the regular contours of the legal form:
For Pashukanis criminal law is merely the derivative extension of the form of
law (a form which has a necessary and autonomous function as private law,
the regulation of production through property) to class oppression. In
conditions of acute class conflict the ideological nature of the legal form in
criminal law is revealed, the juridic mask is discarded to reveal class force
unlimited by legal rules or procedure.80
Thus, both Hunt and Hirst perceive a deep divide in the Pashukanist
general theory, which purportedly bifurcates law into criminal law and
private or civil law. And whereas civil law is consonant with the principle
of equivalence embedded in the commodity form, criminal law merely
pays lip service to this principle, exploding it regularly in favour of the
coercion of class command and control. The implication of such an
alleged dualism is, of course, to endorse the argument that the fit
between the commodity form theory of law and the criminal law is, at
best, an awkward one. Indeed, it appears, from Hunt’s and Hirst’s
perspective, that the criminal law is not subsumed within the homology
between the legal form and the commodity form and, hence, that the so-
called general theory, after all, is pretty circumscribed in its juridical
ambit and explanatory power.
However, this argument fails to comprehend the theoretical requisite
that the role of the state as an instrument of class control has to be
assessed on a quite different level of abstraction from its relation to the
general theory of law. To be sure, the class analysis of the role of the state
ought not to be conflated with the analysis of the state from a juridical
perspective. The former is essentially a political analysis and is
concerned to expose the day-to-day complicity of the state in the
dictatorship of the bourgeoisie; the latter operates at a higher level of
abstraction and is concerned to make sense of the role of the state in
relation to that juridical “absurdity” denominated in the principle of
equivalence. Certainly, the fact that the criminal law is Janus-faced,
secreting behind the legal form its connivance in bourgeois class terror
does not place it outside the pale of nor does it bifurcate the general
theory. The real issue is to make sense of the role of the criminal law, as
a state competency, in relation to the legal form and its private law
manifestations. Jakubowski’s insights are especially valuable here:
79 Hunt 81.
80 Hirst “Introduction” in Edelman Ownership of the Image: Elements for a
Marxist Theory of Law (1979) 10.
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The legal form and the commodity form work their way into the existing
relations hand in hand. As a relatively independent political power develops,
serving the interests of the ruling class as a whole, so too does public law.
Public law regulates the relations between the state and public institutions,
and between these and the citizens; it serves to execute and protect private or
civil law by means of the power of the state. The foundation of all these
relations is still legal subjectivity and the recognition of the legal capacity of
man, which give the relations of domination a general form.81
As a branch of public law, criminal law evidently helps to create the
juridical milieu required for the uniform operation of contract law,
property law, the law of delict and the like. It simultaneously expresses
and facilitates the workings of the legal form. The criminal law was not
imbricated in the birth of the legal form, but its imprimatur is
indispensable to the continued existence and reproduction of that form.
Criminal law may not be linked as conspicuously to the principle of
equivalence as the law of contract and the other branches of private law.
Yet, it is the branch of law in which the legal form is most conspicuously
present, for it is here that the legal subject is found in its most impersonal
and abstract form. It is in the criminal trial that “the juridical element first
and most crudely detaches itself from everyday life and becomes fully
autonomous”.82 It is here that the juridical moment peaks, in the
“transformation of the actions of a concrete person into the proceedings
of a legal party, that is of a legal subject”.83 In other words, criminal law
sets the high-water mark for legal intercourse. It is the branch of law
which depersonalises actors most fully in order to equalise them as legal
subjects most completely. Criminal law is synecdochic for law itself.84 It
represents, in telescoped terms, all the characteristics of the legal form.
There is no more loyal commitment to the notion of equivalence than the
literal replacement of the victim by the state in a criminal matter. Prior
to the replacement, the offender, as individual, had lorded it over the
victim, as individual, and unilaterally had violated the principle of
equivalence. With the intervention of the state, both offender and victim
are transformed from specific individuals into general legal subjects, the
advantage of the offender is eradicated, and the principle of equivalence
is rehabilitated.
The coercive constitution of criminal law is the guarantor of the
Rechtsstaat as exemplar of “market relations among formally free and
equal individuals”.85 From this perspective, criminal law is as much a
part of the legal form as any other branch of law. Criminal law is not
ejected from the compass of the legal form because of its terroristic
aspect; on the contrary, it cements their interdependence. Criminal law
is a second-generation materialisation of the legal form and serves to
81 Jakubowski 49.
82 Pashukanis 167.
83 Ibid.
84 Idem 168.
85 Jessop 85.
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ensure the propagation of both the legal form itself and its first-
generation manifestations. Critics such as Hunt and Hirst have been
quick to perceive a contradiction between criminal law and the legal
form and hence to allege that the commodity form theory does not
withstand scrutiny as a general theory. However, scrutiny of the critics’
concerns reveals quickly that they are groundless. For example, Hunt
argues that Pashukanis commits theoretical heresy trying to reconcile
private law and criminal law:
To provide a bridge that overcame the dualism between private law and state
law he introduces what is undoubtedly the weakest feature of his general
theory. He subsumes his attempt to theorise state and criminal law into a
theory of punishment.86
This is a proposition which beggars belief. Pashukanis’s theory of
punishment is just that, a theory of punishment derived from his theory
of law. There is nothing in his work to suggest that he was attempting the
converse, to extrapolate his theory of punishment into a theory of law.
Also, Pashukanis formulated a theory of crime which is by no means a
by-product of his theory of punishment and which was constructed
directly from the fundamentals of the general theory. Hunt wants to have
his cake and eat it: he charges Pashukanis with dualism; and then
charges him with theoretical aberrance in attempting to resolve the
dualism. However, both charges are trumped up, with neither having a
basis in anything which Pashukanis postulates. And certainly,
Pashukanis did not conflate levels of abstraction as do his critics when
they attempt to fragment the general theory of law or even to annihilate
it.
5 The Public Law-ness of Criminal Justice
Criminal law is a branch of public law and criminal justice is statist. The
entire criminal justice process takes place under the auspices of the state
and its juridical apparatuses. Against this backdrop, Stone alleges:
“Pashukanis’s approach does not explain why the state, and not the
victim or his or he relatives, is the plaintiff in criminal cases.”87
Pashukanis, it appears, is unable to account for the public nature of
criminal law. In other words, Stone reckons that the commodity form
theory of law is deficient for neglecting to elucidate the statist structure
of criminal justice.
86 Hunt 81.
87 Stone 45. Ignatieff “State, Civil Society and Total Institutions: A Critique of
Recent Social Histories of Punishment” in Cohen & Scull (eds) Social Control
and the State: Historical and Comparative Essays (1985) 96-99 has raised the
same issue by challenging the “assumption in Marxist social theory” that
capitalism requires the “state penal sanction”, and suggesting that the threat
of force is not necessary for the reproduction of “exploitative social
relations”.
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Stone’s concern is misplaced. Pashukanis comprehended fully that
criminal law was coercive in its operations. However, he understood also
that the fundamentally juridical nature of the commodity economy
requires such coercion to be public, in the sense that it is separated
formally from the exercise of personal power. Thus, he observes:
Coercion as the imperative addressed by one person to another, and backed
up by force, contradicts the fundamental precondition for dealings between
the owners of commodities … For in the society based on commodity
production, subjection to one person, as a concrete individual, implies
subjection to an arbitrary force, since it is the same thing, for this society, as
the subjection of one owner of commodities to another.88
The core principle of equivalence which defines the commodity economy
is violated, and the reproduction of the commodity economy itself is
rendered precarious, if the coercion which structures it is personalised or
privatised. Pashukanis again states:
This is also why coercion cannot appear here in undisguised form as a simple
act of expediency. It has to appear rather as coercion emanating from an
abstract collective person, exercised not in the interest of the individual from
whom it emanates … but in the interest of all parties to legal transactions.89
In other words, a public authority with coercive competence is inscribed
in the constitution of the commodity economy. So too, by extension, is
the public nature of criminal justice, as the branch of law which is
concerned most, and most conspicuously, with the exercise of that
coercive competence.
The Pashukanist position reduces to the proposition that capitalism
needs a public criminal justice system. That is the answer to Stone’s
complaint.90 Private law may be the “natural” law of the commodity
economy, and may provide the foundation of all legal discourse and
interaction. But it is public law, and criminal law in particular, which is
necessary to secure the conditions for the reproduction of the juridical
physiognomy of capitalism. It is not possible for the bourgeoisie to
entrust its criminal justice system to the operations of private law, as it
has its contractual and proprietary regimes. In other words, criminal
justice in the commodity economy cannot but be statist in its
essentials.91
88 Pashukanis 143.
89 Ibid.
90 It is also the answer to Ignatieff’s challenge to the necessarily statist texture
of criminal justice.
91 There has been a recent rapid growth of private prisons. See Bates “Prisons
for Profit” in Haas & Alpert The Dilemmas of Corrections: Contemporary
Readings (1999) 595; Morgan “Imprisonment: A Brief History, the
Contemporary Scene, and Likely Prospects” in The Oxford Handbook of
Criminology (eds Maguire et al) (2002) 1147-1149. However, this
development does not entail a move away from the basic idea of state
punishment. The private prison continues to enforce a public disposition of
criminal matters.
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Justice in the Rechtsstaat must proceed from the equality postulate.
The parties to a legal transaction may not be equal in fact and one may
have at his disposal many more resources than the other. But the
stronger party cannot expect to rely upon this power differential being
translated into an automatic legal advantage. Formally, at least, he has to
accept the equality postulate which makes his counterpart his peer at
law.92 This is the necessary consequence of the uniform legal subjectivity
conferred upon them by the juridical complexion of the commodity
economy.
However, every crime plunges the idea of legal subjectivity and its
accompanying equality postulate into crisis. Every crime is an exercise in
inequality, a practical failure of the principle of equivalence. It is a
manifesto of personal power or “private rationality” against the juridical
and its core value of equivalence. The offender asserts his interests to be
prior to those of his fellow legal subjects, and thereby approves “the
subjection of one owner of commodities to another”.93 His crime is a
revolt against the levelling effect of legal subjectivity in the commodity
economy. He is a true champion of “the concrete individual” against its
negation, the abstract legal subject,94 and he is not averse to one such
concrete individual enthralling another. He is a recalcitrant legal subject,
challenging the logic of the juridical worldview which is integral to the
ideational life of the capitalist mode of production.95 He is an inveterate
anti-egalitarian, a devotee of the pre-legal, who lives surely, if
unconsciously, by Marx’s famous dictum that equal right is, in its
content, a right of inequality.96
By committing the crime, the offender has adjudged the constraints
upon arbitrariness inscribed in the sphere of privatised legal relations to
be inadequate to the defence of and, by the same token, the re-assertion
of the equality postulate. The fate of the latter thus becomes a public
concern, that is, a matter for state action. Logically, that which the
offender has sundered cannot be relied upon to reconstruct him as a
compliant legal subject. Criminal justice is thus inexorably public justice.
Only the state, as the embodiment of the acquiescent legal subject, has
the capacity to extract from the offender the conformity which is
required to reconcile him to the idea of legal subjectivity, both his own
and everybody else’s. It is one of the dialectical ironies of the legal form
that the efficient reproduction of the private sphere is dependent,
ultimately and unavoidably, upon the public power. The public is the true
guarantor of the private.
92 See Pashukanis 143-144.
93 Idem 143.
94 Ibid.
95 See Engels “Lawyers’ Socialism” in Marx & Engels Collected Works: Volume
26 (1990) 598 who describes the juridical worldview as “the classical one of
the bourgeoisie”.
96 Marx “Critique of the Gotha Programme” in The Marx-Engels Reader (1978)
530 (ed Tucker). The offender likely is blissfully unaware of both the man
and his dictum.
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As noted, criminal justice is perhaps the most eminently public branch
of law. It is in this sphere where the violent nature of the law is most
evident, and hence it is here where it is necessary to restrict the use of
coercion to the formal organs of the state.97 The private settlement of
criminal disputes is not properly legal, in that it is not an organ of state
which has the final say in the disposition of the matter. Such private
resolutions either hark back to a pre-legal past or portend a post-legal
future. Criminal justice is thoroughly legal. Not only is it is dispensed by
the state, but it is also the only variant of justice which involves the state
as a party. It cannot be otherwise.
Civil and criminal cases differ essentially in the fact that the former
involve private parties on both sides while the latter involve a public party
on one side. On the face of it, both parties to a civil matter proceed from
the premise that the principle of equivalence is a valid one. Of course,
each is operating from self-interest, submitting that the other has violated
the principle, and both seek from the court a decision that will re-
establish the principle inter se. While the submissions of either are
entirely self-serving, there is no argument about the cogency of the
juridical relation. Civil disputes are about using that relation to self-
advantage. They do not require state intervention, except as ultimate
arbiter regarding the interpretation of the principle of equivalence.
The offender has no such agenda. He does not seek to use the principle
of equivalence to his advantage. Instead, he rejects the principle, albeit
usually unthinkingly or unwittingly. He asserts a claim to operate outside
the parameters of law, and not only in the sense of breaking the letter of
the law. Objectively, a crime is, therefore, an act of outright subversion
of the legal relation. The offender has no stake in co-operating or even
competing with the victim in curial proceedings to settle the
interpretation of the principle of equivalence. In these circumstances, it
is necessary for the state to become a party to the matter and to compel
the offender to respect the principle and to participate in its operation. If
a crime is a repudiation of the principle of equivalence, then the criminal
trial is its affirmation.
It has been held that: “From a Marxist perspective, state control over
deviance is an integral feature of modern capitalism and is not likely to
be relinquished.”98 The truth is that relinquishment of “state control over
deviance” is not only unlikely but also unthinkable. Such control is an
indispensable feature of modern capitalism and its criminal justice
system and hence cannot be forsaken. The capitalist social formation
requires a criminal justice system which operates under the aegis of its
state. The notion of a private criminal justice does violence to the idea of
the legal subject who lives (and dies) by the principle of equivalence.
97 Seagle The History of Law (1946) 6-7.
98 Minor & Morrison “A Theoretical Study and Critique of Restorative Justice”
in Restorative Justice: International Perspectives (1996) 124.
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Despite their origins in private law, the legal form and its concomitants
cannot survive without the patronage of the state.
6 Excursus: Pashukanis in South Africa
There is a vibrant and admirable jurisprudence promoting constitutional
democracy and defending human rights in South Africa. However, the
commodity form theory of law falls outside the ambit of this
jurisprudential matrix and seldom, if ever, is given considered
philosophical attention. This neglect of Pashukanis may be due to the fact
that South African jurisprudence, in the main, yet has to confront the
capitalist character of the South African social formation. The capitalist
mode of production long has been dominant in South Africa, and
certainly throughout both the apartheid and the post-apartheid eras.
Whereas apartheid may have obscured somewhat the capitalist
fundamentals of society, the transformation to a non-racial democracy
has rendered them starkly visible. Indeed, this politico-legal
transformation was simultaneously a process of normalisation: South
Africa lost its racist exceptionalism and took its place as a regular
member of the capitalist world system.99
Capitalist normalisation calls for a jurisprudence which transcends the
conventional liberal concern with liberty, equality and the rule of law.
Liberal jurisprudence stands perplexed in the face of the scandalous
socio-economic inequalities and the epidemic of criminality, violent and
economic, which continue to embarrass a country in the van of
constitutional democracy internationally. These debilities are linked
intimately to its idealist conception of law as a system of norms,
obstructing comprehension of the material foundations of legal relations.
Pashukanism is about excavating the material basis of the juridical in
the commodity economy and apprehending the structural comity
between legal relations and capitalist relations of production. It has been
argued persuasively that “without a theory of the legal form, the
specificity of law itself is impenetrable”.100 Pashukanism supplies the
theory of the legal form which liberal jurisprudence lacks. The
commodity form theory of law well could provide the analytical roadmap
needed to comprehend the explosive contradictions between the
politico-legal and the socio-economic which bedevil the South African
transformation, and to grasp the logic of the post-apartheid crime
emergency. And it well could hold the key to the development of a
jurisprudence which engages properly the capitalist context of legal
relations. Certainly, a South African jurisprudence which continues to
ignore Pashukanis is depriving itself of a rich and robust epistemological
resource.
99 See generally Alexander An Ordinary Country: Issues in the Transition from
Apartheid to Democracy in South Africa (2002).
100 Miéville Between Equal Rights: A Marxist Theory of International Law (2005)
2.
  Pashukanis on crime and punishment    509
7 Conclusion
The private law origins of the commodity form theory of law cannot
constitute an ontological barrier to its extension to public law.
Pashukanis’s derivation of the general theory from the law of contract
was a necessary one, dictated by the real history of the legal form. Of
course, theories cannot be confined within the narrow limits of their
birth, and the generalisation of the commodity form theory was a natural
occurrence, more or less. What is more, unlike so many other general
theories of law which tend to be ahistorical, Pashukanis’s has the virtue
of laying bare its own material parentage in the evolution of the
commodity economy.
This article has rebutted the argument that the general theory is
insufficient in that it is unable to explain crime and its punishment. It has
shown that substantial aspects of the criminal justice process and of
criminal law may be read as manifestations of the principle of
equivalence. It has demonstrated, also, that the principle of equivalence
is able to account for criminal punishment easily and without resort to
rhetorical device. Of course, the general theory cannot explain all the
specificities of criminal justice doctrine. However, that is not its function.
No general theory of law can be expected to traverse every nook and
cranny of every branch of law. The primary task of the Pashukanist
general theory of law is to clarify why law as a whole takes the form it
does. It achieves this task with some considerable proficiency and élan.
Thus, it may be contended confidently that there exist “good grounds for
taking seriously Pashukanis’s claim that his is a general theory of law,
and not one illicitly generalised from private civil law”.101 In its turn,
South African jurisprudence would do well to take Pashukanism seriously
as a general theory of law.
101 Norrie 434.
